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NO (PREGNANT) WOMAN IS AN ISLAND: THE
CASE FOR A CAREFULLY DELIMITED USE
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS TO ENFORCE
GESTATIONAL RESPONSIBILITYt
I. INTRODUCTION
THE STATISTICS are terrifying. An estimated 375,000 children
are born each year in the United States who have been exposed to
illegal drugs prenatally, and that number may grow to several mil-
lion per year by the turn of the century.1 Another 5,000 babies per
year are born with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS)2 and still another
t This paper was written under the supervision of Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Special thanks goes to Mr. Allan
Hutt for his support and patience.
1. Clifford, Bill Would Help Drug Mons, Kids, Newsday, June 13, 1990, at 2; (citing a
congressional study entitled "The Enemy Within: Crack-Cocaine and America's Families,"
which estimates there will be between 500,000 and four million drug-impaired infants born
annually by the year 2000); Wagner, Cost of Maternal Drug Abuse Drawing Notice, Modern
Healthcare, March 26, 1990, at 21 (citing a 1988 study by the National Association of Per-
inatal Addiction Research and Education, which found that eleven percent of women deliver-
ing babies in thirty-six hospitals were substance abusers). This finding, when applied to the
3.8 million births annually in the United States, translates into the 375,000 figure often
quoted. Individual hospitals report widely varying percentages of pregnant substance abus-
ers. See Houtz, Mother's Drug Use Afflicts Infants in Snohomish County, Seattle Times, Oct.
15, 1990, at Al (University of Washington study found that 9% of women delivering babies
at four Seattle hospitals admitted to using cocaine); Lee, Pregnant Drug Abusers Find Hope in
Program, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at B3, col. I (reporting that 12% of new mothers in
Harlem used drugs during pregnancy); Give Junkie Moms Treatment, Not Jail, USA Today,
Oct. 23, 1990, at 10A (study in Fairbanks, Alaska, showed that 14.2% of the babies born
there were born to mothers who used illegal drugs during pregnancy)[hereinafter Junkie
Moms]; Skolnick, Drug Screening in Prenatal Care Demands Objective Medical Criteria, Sup-
port Services, 264 J. A.M.A. 309 (1990) (study of 1,088 patients who delivered in the Medical
Center of Delaware, Newark, showed that 15.9% were substance abusers); Kirk, Committee
OKs Reporting of Drug-Addicted Babies, United Press Int'l., July 11, 1990 (wire copy) (Phila-
delphia Perinatal Society reported that 16% of women giving birth in Philadelphia use co-
caine); Gilliam, Putting Our Children First, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1990, at B3 (two
Washington, D.C. hospitals report that 18% to 32% of pregnant women admitted to drug
use); McNamara, Snared By Drugs, Haunted by Loss; Birth in the 'Death Zones, Boston
Globe, Sept. 12, 1990, at 1 (reporting that 18% of mothers delivering at Boston City Hospital
used cocaine during pregnancy); Beyette, A Second Motherhood, Family: As Their Own Chil-
dren Fight Addiction, Grandmothers Take a Course on Caring for Babies Prenatally Exposed
to Drugs, L.A. Times, June 24, 1990, at 1E, col. 2 (reporting that 40% of babies born at
Charles Drew-Martin Luther King Jr. General Hospital in Los Angeles test positive for drug
use).
2. Doctors Criticized on Fetal Problem, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at B10, col. 6 [here-
inafter Fetal Problem] (citing National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence statis-
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35,000 a year arrive exhibiting "alcohol-related birth defects." '3
The effects of the drugs and alcohol on these children are
equally nightmarish.4 In the first three months of gestation in a
woman using cocaine the vital organs of the fetus may be de-
formed.5 Further, there is evidence that the fetus incurs the worst
damage from maternal cocaine use during the last trimester of ges-
tation, when the its brain fails to grow properly and the central ner-
vous system is harmed.6 The fetus within the cocaine-using woman
is at risk for intrauterine strokes, premature birth, and low birth
weight; and the resulting newborn often suffers from physical, mo-
tics); But see Rovner, Hospital Fails to Identify Alcohol-Affected Newborns, Wash. Post, Nov.
6, 1990, at Z5 (reporting that in one study, at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center in Dallas, researchers found that hospital staff almost completely failed to notice
symptoms of FAS, so estimates of this syndrome may be vastly unreliable).
3. Fetal Problem, supra note 2.
4. Rosenak, Diamant, Yaffe & Hornstein, Cocaine: Maternal Use During Pregnancy
and Its Effect on the Mother, the Fetus, and the Infant, 45 Obstet. Gynecol. Surv. 348 (June,
1990). Another potential concern is tobacco use by pregnant women. Smoking causes low
birth weights, difficult births, and cleft lips and palates; and has been linked to higher infant
death rates, problems in mental and behavioral development, and cancer. Dr. Cynthia
Bearer, of Children's Hospital, Talks About Links of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Mental
Retardation, Bus. Wire, March 6, 1991 (wire copy). However, this paper concentrates on
illegal drugs and alcohol. Smoking might well fit within the criminalization guidelines set out
later in this paper, providing that the long-term damage done by prenatal maternal use is
empirically established quantitatively and qualitatively. See Singer, Maternal Smoking and
Fetal Injury: Medical, Legal, and Societal Consequences, 21 AHA J. OF HEALTH AND Hosp.
L. 153 (1988), for an in-depth analysis of the argument that smoking by pregnant women
properly could be criminalized.
5. Erikson, UA Study Cites Tie Between Coke, Defects, Ariz. Daily Star, Oct. 7, 1990,
at 1, col. 4. (study headed by Dr. Eugene Hoyme, a birth defects specialist with the Univer-
sity of Arizona Children's Research Center, shows a link between prenatal maternal use of
cocaine and the birth of babies with deformed or missing arms and fingers, heart defects, and
bleeding brains); The Prisoners of the Womb: Pregnant Drug Abusers Need Treatment, Not
Prison Cells, Newsday, Nov. 20, 1989, Viewpoints, at 52 [hereinafter, Prisoners of the Womb].
6. Prisoners of the Womb, supra note 5. The damage is heightened by the unique char-
acteristics of cocaine. According to Dr. Stephen Piazza, assistant neonatalogist and director
of the White Plains, N.Y., Medical Center's Follow-Up Clinic for Substance-Abused Infants,
when a pregnant woman takes cocaine---especially crack-the placenta "becomes a one-way
valve," because when the cocaine passes through to the fetus, it is "transformed into a fat-
soluble substance too heavy to return through the placenta." Thus, the cocaine derivative
stays in the fetus' circulation, "and the infant keeps getting high, high, high." The doctor
said that while newborns withdraw from other drugs within 72 hours, withdrawal from crack
cocaine may not start for two weeks and may last two years. Melvin, When Mothers and
Infants Are Addicts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, Section 12WC, at 1, col. 1. The effect of the
cocaine on the babies of drug users is readily apparent at birth. Brazelton, Why Is America
Failing Its Children, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1990, Section 6, at 41, col. 2 ("disorganization of
[the cocaine-exposed babies'] nervous systems ... is apparent to anyone who sees the baby.
They are either limp and unresponsive or are hypersensitive and behave chaotically. They
have difficulty receiving and responding to the stimuli of a soothing voice or face. When they
are cuddled or rocked, they react with piercing wails and jerky motions").
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tor, and emotional developmental problems and is ten times more
likely to die of crib death.7 In addition, the baby born drug-im-
paired is at extreme risk of physical abuse by parents or caretakers
who cannot cope with the kaleidoscope of problems presented by
the child.'
The agony for the cocaine-impaired child is not short-lived. A
study of 263 such children in the Chicago area, two years after
birth, revealed that the children had "great difficulty organizing
their responses to their surroundings"; scored lower on tests for
ability to concentrate, interact with others, and play by themselves;
showed emotional flatness (no strong feelings of any kind); and dis-
played symptoms similar to mild autism.9
FAS can be identified by its victims' characteristic facial abnor-
malities (small head circumference, small or slitted eyes, shortened
nose, and flattened mid-face),1 which diagnosing doctors refer to as
7. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy; Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and
Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women (Board of Trustees
Report; Law and Medicine Section, AMA) 264 J. A.M.A. 2663 (1990) (citing numerous
medical reports) [hereinafter, Legal Interventions]; Brill, Should We Give Up?, Am. Law.,
March, 1990, Headnotes, at 3; Whitaker, Protecting Baby from Mom: Tot Welfare at Issue in
Drug Cases, Newsday, Nov. 6, 1989, News, at 8.
8. Effectiveness of the Administration's Drug Strategy One Year After Its Creation:
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 6, 1990) (statement of Joe Biden,
Chair)("The bad news is that because of the particularly serious problems relating to the
inability of a child to bond with a parent, as a consequence of being born addicted, that not
only is there a problem at that moment and potentially a problem for the long-term develop-
ment of the child, but they find that very child back in the emergency room a week, a month,
a year, two years later, because the parents, whether or not they're still on drugs, cannot
handle the incessant crying, the inability to relate, on the part of the child born to drugs, and
beats the living hell out of that child out of frustration, anger, hatred-whatever reason").
9. Blakeslee, Crack's Toll Among Babier A Joyless View, Even of Toys, N. Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1989, at 1, col. 2. Autism is a disease characterized by self-absorption, especially
extreme withdrawal into fantasy. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 55 (1980). Researchers
helping to prepare the New York City school system for the flood of drug-impaired young-
sters it expects to have to cope with in the next year or two have documented the following
problems: delayed speech, an inability to sit still, short attention spans, deafness and blind-
ness, cerebral palsy, a tendency toward violent temper tantrums, and difficulty making
friends. Hemphiil, First Wave of Crack Casualties; NY Schools Unprepared, Officials Say,
Newsday, Sept. 4, 1990, at 7. According to Dr. Judy Howard, a clinical professor of pediat-
rics at the UCLA School of Medicine, teachers at the Salvin Special Education Center in Los
Angeles have found that drug-impaired children "are easily overwhelmed by too many people
or toys and too much noise or movement. Often they play by scattering, batting or picking
up and putting down toys rather than combining them in patterns and engaging in fantasy
play." Hamilton, Crack's Children Grow Up: The First Wave of Youngsters Prenatally Ex-
posed to Cocaine is Expected to Hit an Ill-Prepared Education System This Year, L.A. Times,
Aug. 24, 1990, at IA, col. 1.
10. Note, Maternal Substance Abuse" The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1211-12 (1987) citing H. ROsETT & L. WEINER, ALCOHOL AND
THE FETus 6 (1984)[hereinafter Maternal Substance Abuse].
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the FLK ("funny-looking kid") syndrome. Between 30 and 59 per-
cent of children born with FAS have heart problems, as well as or-
gan, joint, and limb malformations." FAS also produces
intrauterine growth retardation, particularly in the third trimester
of gestation, leading to low birth weight, increased infant mortality,
impeded motor development, speech problems, mental retardation,
hyperactivity, and slow growth after birth. 2 Maternal consump-
tion of alcohol is one of three leading causes of mental retardation
in the United States.13
The cost for caring for these impaired infants and children is
enormous. It is estimated that the initial cost of caring for the
100,000 crack-impaired babies (out of the 375,000 estimated total of
drug-impaired) is $20 billion per year 4, and that the annual cost of
caring for the estimated 8,000 FAS babies totals about a third of a
billion dollars. 5 In addition, cost for the specialized education
needed by these children currently amounts to more than $18,000
per year, per child, four-and-one-half times as much as for non-im-
paired children. 6 The loss to the country in terms of these future
adults' inability to successfully enter the work force or provide for
their own daily needs is incalculable.
Separating the drug-impaired newborns from their mothers via
custody or dependency hearings has become a growing norm in
many jurisdictions." Recently, however, the generals in the "War
on Drugs," the prosecutors, have added a new weapon to their arse-
11. Id., at 1216 (citing E.L. Abel, FetalAlcoholSyndmme and FetalAlcohol Effects 123-
33 (1984) and H. Rosett & L. Weiner, supra note 11, at 39-40).
12. Id, at 1213 (citing E.L. Abel, supra note 11, at 83).
13. Id., at 1214 (citing Gal & Sharpless, Fetal Drug Exposure-Behavioral Teratogene-
sis, 18 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL PHARMACY 186, 188 (1984)).
14. Wagner, supra note 1 (citing a report by the inspector general's office of the Health
and Human Services Dept). This total includes "costs of delivery, perinatal care and foster
care, as well as developmental, educational and additional health services for the children
through age 5. See also, Hoye, Fear of Jail Keeps Pregnant Addicts from Seeking Help, Ariz.
Daily Star, Sept. 28, 1990, at lB, col. 1. The annual cost of the hospital bills for treating
drug-impaired babies alone amounts to $21 million in Florida, $60 million in Illinois and $1
billion in California.
15. Blume, Drinking During Pregnancy Puts Fetus at Risk, Newsday, July 26, 1990,
(Viewpoints) at 69 (citing a special report to congress on alcohol and health, published by the
Depart. of Health and Human Services).
16. Trost, Second Chance: As Drug Babies Grow Older, Schools Strive to Meet Their
Needs, 71 Wall Street J. 51, Dec. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 1. See also, All Babies Count Strategy
Session Seeks Solutions to US. Drug-Exposed Infant Epidemic, PR Newswire, Oct. 25, 1990
(wire copy) (citing General Accounting Office report that the cost to the U.S. economy per
each drug-exposed child, from birth to age eighteen, is now estimated at $1 million).
17. Typical of this trend is Ventura County, California, where the county's social serv-
ices department's record of asking for court custody of newborns jumped from seven in 1985
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nal, aimed at combatting prenatally drug- and alcohol-impaired
children."8 Using a tactic which apparently is supported by a ma-
jority of the people in the United States, 19 several dozen women
have been charged with an assortment of criminal offenses for using
illegal drugs or alcohol during their pregnancies.20
The move to criminalize prenatal maternal behavior has been
criticized by feminists, medical groups, and civil libertarians.2" On
the other hand, some commentators have argued that many more
activities of pregnant women should hold the potential for criminal
sanctions. 22 There seemingly is no middle ground between the view
that criminalization is not only futile but invades women's most
precious Constitutional rights and the opposing view that women,
by conceiving and/or failing to abort their fetuses, forfeit their
claims to rights of privacy and personal autonomy and assume a
legal duty to deliver whole and healthy babies.
This paper is an attempt to explore the neglected middle
ground, to answer the question of whether legislation can be written
that responds, constructively, to the horrors visited on children by
the use of drugs and alcohol pre-birth by their mothers and yet pays
due regard for the delicate, intimate territory into which the
lawmakers propose to tread.
to 78 in 1988. Martin, Program Weans Mothers, Unborn Babies From Drugs, L.A. Times,
Jan. 20, 1991, at lB, col. 2.
18. Although criminal charges were brought (unsuccessfully) against a substance-abus-
ing mother as early as 1977 (Reyes v. Superior Ci, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 41 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1977)), the attempted use of criminal sanctions against this group of women was rare prior
to 1988.
19. Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., March 1990, at 51. (seventy-one
percent of 1,500 people in fifteen southern states polled by the Atlanta Constitution favored
criminal penalties for illegal drug use by pregnant women which results in injuries to their
fetuses).
20. The charges have ranged from "willful failure to provide medical attention to a mi-
nor child" (Pamela Rae Stewart, 1986); to involuntary manslaughter and supplying drugs to
a minor (Melanie Green, 1989); to vehicular homicide (Josephine Pellegrini, 1989); and to
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill (Sandra Inzar, 1990). The cases against these
women are fully discussed in the section titled "Fledging Attempts at Criminalization of
Maternal Behavior," at pp--.
21. Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy: New Issues for the Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990,
at 14, col. 1. Fourteen public health groups and women's advocacy groups, ranging from the
American Public Health Association to the National Organization of Women are backing the
appeal filed in the case of Jennifer Johnson, the first woman to be convicted of delivery of
drugs to a minor through the umbilical cord. See Page, Jail Is No Solution For This Problem,
Chi. Tribune, May 21, 1989, Prospective, at 3 (quoting Lynn Paltrow, the American Civil
Liberties Union attorney who defended Pamela Rae Stewart, "Considering the shortage of
medical care, threatening drug-addicted women with jail is a cruel hoax").
22. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Child-
birth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437-38 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as Procreative Liberty].
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To reach an answer to that question, this paper reviews: 1) the
reasons for and costs of criminalization; 2) lawmaking difficulties
which arise from the type of criminalization proposed; 3) current
attempts to criminalize; 4) two opposing views of the Constitutional
and common law proscriptions and cautions regarding controls on
an individual's (and in particular, a pregnant woman's) behavior;
and 5) a possible middle ground approach. Finally, this paper con-
cludes with the components for a model law which carefully bal-
ances the rights and realities of the parties involved.23
II. RATIONALES FOR AND COSTS OF
CRIMINALIZATION
The rationales for criminalization of prenatal maternal behavior
are divided along societal and personal interest lines. Society in
general has an interest in protecting potential human life2 4; deter-
ring the abuse of drugs and alcohol; exacting retribution from par-
ents whose behavior results in injured children; and reducing the
costs of taking care of damaged children.
On a personal level, the soon-to-be child has an interest in being
born whole, unimpaired by the drug and alcohol abuse of his or her
mother. The woman, too, has an interest in the "wholeness" of her
child and in rehabilitation for herself.
The question, of course, is whether criminalization of prenatal
maternal behavior addresses any of these concerns. And the an-
swer, just as clearly, is that it depends on the method of criminaliza-
23. Although the historical and/or political underpinnings for the elevation of "fetal
rights" are of interest as a backdrop to the issue of criminalization of maternal prenatal be-
havior, a delineation of those underpinnings is unnecessary to the purpose of this paper. It
persuasively has been argued that the move toward recognition of "fetal rights" stems from
renovations in tort law; the ability of scientists, by way of biotechnological innovation, to
pierce the black veil of the womb and decipher a "person" within; the willingness of Ameri-
cans to sublimate their Constitutional rights for the good of the "drug war"; an end-run
attempt around Roe v. Wade by those of the anti-reproductive-choice persuasion; and/or a
new eugenics movement. Supporting material on any or all of these arguments is plentiful.
As a start, researchers may wish to review the following: Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health
Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses 16
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (1988)(hereinafter referred to as Pregnancy Police);
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 9 (1987); Note, Of Women's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to
Her Fetus-Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 807 (1987); Murphy, The
Evolution of the Prenatal Duty Rule: Analysis by Inherent Determinants, 7 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 351 (1982). Suffice it to say, for the purpose of this paper, the sheer numbers of im-
paired newborns alone is an adequate base from which to launch an exploration of a possible
remedy.
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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tion. For instance, charging a woman with fetal abuse while she is
still pregnant and incarcerating her may be a means to the ends of
retribution and deterrence (of both the individual woman charged
and other women who, without such example, would participate in
the criminalized behavior). However, it is unlikely that any of the
other interests will be solved by that use of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Incarceration, typically in jails or prisons which supply no
prenatal care or diet25 and in which the supply of drugs may be as
plentiful as on the streets,26 does nothing to protect the potential
human life, reduce the cost of caring for the resulting damaged chil-
dren, encourage "wholeness," or facilitate treatment and
rehabilitation.'
The costs of criminalization also split along the societal-personal
line. Any attempt to criminalize the behavior of pregnant women
can reasonably be expected to increase the number of abortions per-
formed in this country.2" Criminalization also will erect another
barrier to assuring adequate prenatal care to pregnant women. Fear
of being "turned in" by their doctors and convicted by evidence and
statements unearthed during prenatal care will keep some women
25. Churchville, D.C. Judge Jails Woman as Protection for Fetus: Convicted Thief Alleg-
edly Uses Cocaine, Wash. Post, July 23, 1988, at 1. Pregnant inmates in the District of Co-
lumbia jails receive double portions of food, but no special diets or exercise. They receive
medical checkups once a month and spend the last two weeks of their pregnancies in the jail
infirmary. il
26. Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 20 [hereinafter, Preg-
nant?](woman sentenced to spend the duration of her pregnancy in a District of Columbia
jail, refused drugs offered to her in jail). See also, Weikel, Report Assails Conditions at State
Prison for Women, L.A. Times, April 11, 1990, at 3A, col. 1, citing a report by the Joint
Legislative Committee on Prison Construction and Operation, which declared that the wo-
men's prison in California was the state prison with "'the worse reputation for drug
trafficking.'"
27. Pregnant?, supra note 26. The problems created by incarcerating pregnant women
are illustrated by three cases fied in California, alleging deficient health care for the pregnant
plaintiff inmates. In one, Louwanna Yeager claimed she was forced to deliver her baby on
the floor of the Kern County Jail in Bakersfield after jail officials failed to heed her pleas for
help. Yeager v. Smith, No. CV-F-87-493 (E.D. Cal.). In another, the California Institution
for Women in 1987 settled a class action suit filed against it by inmates who had been preg-
nant while at the facility. The institution promised to provide adequate prenatal care. Harris
v. McCarthy, No. 85-6002 (C.D. Cal.). In the third case, Doris Mitchell claimed that her
jailers refused to give her the methadone prescribed for her and, as a result, her eight-month-
old fetus died in utero from the stresses of "cold turkey" withdrawal. Jones v. Dyer, No. H-
114154-0 (Cal. Super. Ct.).
28. Legal Interventions, supra note 7,; McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the
Rise, Boston Globe, Oct. 3, 1989, at 1 (quoting Sandra Garcia, a psychologist at the Univer-
sity of South Florida: "What the 'right-to-lifers' don't realize is that by criminalizing addic-
tion there are going to be more late abortions as women decide they don't want to risk jail.").
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from seeking it.2 9 Further, this same fear will erode the patient-
physician relationship which is essential for properly monitoring the
progress of a pregnancy. 30 Another societal cost is the further harm
or death to fetuses due to incarceration of their mothers.31  Last,
there are monetary costs for detecting, prosecuting, and punishing
drug and alcohol-abusing pregnant women.
At the personal level, the pregnant woman, under any criminal-
ization statute, suffers an invasion of privacy and loss of a certain
amount of autonomy and freedom. The right to privacy and per-
sonal autonomy is a cornerstone of the American way of life, ema-
nating from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights,32 and entitled to the
deepest respect under the common law.33 As the United States
Supreme Court said in Botsford, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded... than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others."' 34 The recognition of the right to privacy
was reaffirmed in Roe v. Wade as, in which the court held that a
29. Legal Interventions, supra note 7. ("Pregnant women will be likely to avoid seeking
prenatal or other medical care for fear that their physicians' knowledge of substance abuse or
other potentially harmful behavior could result in a jail sentence rather than proper medical
treatment."); Hoye, supra note 14, (quoting the testimony of one former cocaine addict, who
told doctors and prosecutors that, "When I found out I was pregnant, I stayed away from
any kind of services because of the threat of jail"); Page, supra note 17 (quoting Lynn Pal-
trow, American Civil Liberties Union attorney: "[C]ommon sense also tells us that such
action (criminalization of prenatal maternal behavior) sends twin messages. One of them is
this: Don't do drugs if you're pregnant or you will go to jail. That's the one we want to send.
But the other message is: Don't go to a doctor if you're pregnant and doing drugs or authori-
ties will put you in jail as a remedy.").
30. Don't Punish the Troubled Mothers, Texas Law., May 28, 1990, at 39, quoting ex-
cerpts from ACLU testimony at the May 17, 1990, hearing by the House Select Committee
on Children, Youth, and Families, on "Law and Policy Affecting Addicted Women and
Their children." ("Florida doctors report that after their pregnant patients learned that they
could be reported for drug use, they "could no longer depend on the mothers to tell them the
truth about their drug use .... ")
31. Legal Interventions, supra note 7 "Prison health experts warn that prisons are
'shockingly deficient' in attending to the health care needs of pregnant women. Pregnant
women in jail are routinely subject to conditions that are hazardous to fetal health .... ",
citing Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARV. WOMEN's L. J. 189-205 (1989); Silverman, Com-
binations of Drugs Taken by Pregnant Women Add to Problems in Determining Fetal Damage,
261 J. A.M.A. 1694 (1989). Pregnant women who abruptly and completely stop taking
opiates or narcotics after using them for more than the first five months of pregnancy risk
complications of their pregnancies, including the total cessation of blood flow to the placenta.
See also supra note 27.
32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
33. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
34. Id. at 251.
35. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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guarantee of zones of privacy for individuals does exist under the
Constitution.
III. GRAPPLING WITH THE DIFFICULT SUB-ISSUES
Criminalization of prenatal maternal behavior presents some
special, difficult questions which must be answered. First, what is
the applicable stage of pregnancy for criminalization of the behavior
and for charging the woman who commits that behavior? Second,
how will the state establish a causal connection between the behav-
ior and the harm to the fetus or child? Third, what type of criminal
charge will be pressed? And, finally, which activities will be
criminalized?
A. Pinpointing a Time for Criminalization and Charging
The state might choose any number of points in the pregnancy
as the appropriate trigger for criminalization of behavior. Each im-
plicates the rights of the pregnant woman in a different way. For
instance, if conception is the trigger for criminalization of activity,
then, as one professor of medical genetics has suggested, a woman
should assume that once she has reached the mid-point of her men-
strual cycle she is carrying a fetus and plan her activities
accordingly.36
"Quickening," '37 "viability, '31 and birth all have been deemed
appropriate triggers for increased concern for the fetus by the state
in other contexts.3 9 Each, in turn, impacts on a woman's autonomy
with less force.
36. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 . OF LEGAL MED. 63, 84
(1984). Cf Procreative Liberty, supra note 22, at 447: ("If she has reason to know she is
pregnant-if, for example, she has been sexually active and has missed a period-but she has
not yet had her pregnancy confirmed, it does not seem unreasonable to require her either to
have a pregnancy test or to refrain from activities that would be hazardous to the fetus if she
were pregnant.").
37. Defined as "to begin to show signs of life." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 719
(1980); "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and
it begins in contemplation of law a[s] soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129 (1765).
38. Defined as "capable of living; especially said of a fetus that has reached such a stage
of development that it can live outside the uterus." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1974).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1989) (defining Feticide as the killing of an unborn child
"so far developed as to be ordinarily called "quick" through the murder or attempted murder
of the mother); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2 (Bums 1905) (restricting abortion after viabil-
ity); Murphy, The Evolution of the Prenatal Duty Rule: Analysis by Inherent Determinants, 7
U. DAYTON L. REV. 351 (1982) (reviewing tort law as it affects the child who was harmed as
a fetus).
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Beyond the decision of when the state will declare certain activi-
ties criminal, the state also must decide when to charge the woman.
Charging a woman in the midst of her pregnancy creates special
concerns for her well-being and that of the fetus.' ° However, wait-
ing to prosecute women until after their babies are born eliminates
the possibility of preventing or ameliorating damage to the growing
fetus.
B. Questions of Causation
Criminalization of the behavior of pregnant women also
presents some unique problems of establishing a causal relationship
to the harm done to the fetus. Three problems in particular stand
out. Since developing fetuses are damaged by a myriad of factors41,
many unknown, the state may have a difficult time proving that the
damage to the newly born child was caused by drug or alcohol
use.4' If a woman is charged in the midst of her pregnancy, it may
be difficult or impossible to determine if the fetus actually has been
harmed by the woman's actions.4 3 Finally, the state may need to
argue a rebuttable presumption of prenatal maternal alcohol or
drug use in cases where an infant is born damaged but there is no
direct evidence of the maternal substance abuse.
C. Type of Charge and Due Process Concerns
The state also must determine what type of charge it will use to
40. See supra note 23.
41. Arbuckle & Sherman, Comparison of the Risk Factors for Pre-Term Delivery and
Intrauterine Growth Retardation, 3 PAEDIATRIC PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 115 (1989)
(Canadian study revealing that the predictors for intrauterine growth retardation and pre-
term delivery included the height and pre-pregnancy weight of the mother; the mother's edu-
cation; the sex of the infant; and the household income level); Protecting Unborn Babies From
Lead, Chi. Tribune, April 1, 1990, at 2. (lead can be absorbed from automobile exhaust and
can damage the brain, causing learning problems and retardation in the fetus).
42. Behavior Varies in Babies Exposed to Cocaine, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1991, at 3C, col.
1, quoting Dr. Dan Griffith, a developmental psychologist at the National Association for
Perinatal Addiction Research and Education in Chicago: "[Tit's difficult to categorize babies
because there are so many different factors affecting the infant all at once." Dr. Griffith noted
that babies exposed to cocaine in the womb also may have been exposed "to other drugs,
received little or no prenatal care and suffered from poor maternal nutrition during preg-
nancy," all of which have an impact on the prognoses for the children. Id. See also, Griffin,
Early Care Sought For Some Kids, Chi. Trib., Feb. 27, 1991, Chicagoland, at 4 (noting that
drug-impaired babies also are "stunted ... by the dysfunctional nature of the family into
which they are born.").
43. Note that Diane Pfannenstiel of Wyoming delivered an apparently healthy baby
boy, after she had been charged with child abuse for drinking while she was pregnant. Wo-
man in Fetal Alcohol Case Gives Birth to Healthy Infant, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1990, at 20,
col. 4.
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criminalize women's prenatal maternal behavior. Delivery of a con-
trolled substance to a minor, fetal or child abuse, and degrees of
homicide all have been used, with varying degrees of success."
Additionally, the state must decide which activities will be
criminalized. A state might make the decision to criminalize mater-
nal use of only those substances which already are illegal (i.e., co-
caine). However, the state interest in preserving potential life may
be better served by criminalization based on the amount of harm
rather than by illegality of use. Incorporated within this decision is
the sub-issue of whether to criminalize only commissions, or omis-
sions as well. As an example of the latter, at least one commentator
argues that a woman should face criminal sanctions if she fails to
submit to genetic testing. 5 Also within this question is the scope of
the criminalization. Since any number of activities might be harm-
ful to a developing fetus,46 the state must determine which of them
should be criminalized.
Finally, a question of due process arises on two fronts.47 First,
women must be put on notice that certain behaviors during preg-
nancy may place them at risk of criminal sanction. Second, it is
arguably fundamentally unfair to penalize women for addictions for
which treatment is the only possible remedy when that treatment is
unavailable to almost all pregnant women. 8
44. These charges are fully discussed in the section titled "Fledgling Attempts at
Criminalization of Maternal Behavior" at pp.-.
45. Procreative Liberty, supra note 22, at 449.
46. Shaw, supra note 36, at 83. Prenatal duties early in pregnancy include "regular
prenatal checkups, a balanced diet with vitamin, iron, and calcium supplementation, weight
control, and judicious use of medications, tobacco, and caffeine." It is not hard to add to that
list the abstinence from other possible detriments to a pregnancy, such as working too hard or
in an unhealthy or toxic environment; not getting enough rest; and having intercourse with a
spouse, etc. Id.
47. In addition, the question of unequal prosecution now is being raised by civil libertar-
ians. Haines, Sheer Racism Thwarts Efforts to Track Babies Born to Drug-addicted Mothers,
United Press Int'l, Dec. 18, 1990 (wire copy), (noting that a study in one county of Florida
that showed that while black and white pregnant women tested positive for drugs in the same
percentages, black women were ten times more likely to be reported for that use). See also,
Stone, Prosecutors Focus on Drug Use, Pregnancy, USA Today, Feb. 26, 1990, at 3A, (study
by the American Civil Liberties Union tracked forty women who were prosecuted for prena-
tal maternal behavior. Of those forty, twenty-six were black, one was Hispanic, and six were
white).
48. Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1990, Section 6,
at 34, col. 1, citing a survey of New York City's drug treatment programs by Dr. Wendy
Chavkin, Columbia University School of Public Health, that showed that 54% excluded
pregnant women and 87% would not take women whose costs were being paid by Medicaid
or any other public program; also quoting Barbara A. Klingenmaier, Muskegon County,
Michigan, foster-care supervisor, who said that Medicaid will only pay for seventeen days out
of a typical twenty-eight-day recovery program. Also see, Drug-Exposed Infants GAO Calls
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IV. FLEDGLING ATTEMPTS AT CRIMINALIZATION OF
MATERNAL BEHAVIOR
Three types of criminal statutes and one additional criminal
sanction have been employed against pregnant or just-delivered wo-
men who used drugs or alcohol during pregnancy.49 The charges
fall broadly into the categories of drug delivery, feticide or homi-
cide, and fetus neglect/abuse. In addition, preventive detention has
been used to sequester pregnant women for the duration of their
pregnancies. This section will explore each of these types of
charges, examining a few of the burgeoning number of cases
brought within the last ten years5', any applicable statutes, and the
judicial response to the charge.
A. Drug Delivery
The first U.S. criminal conviction of a mother who gave birth to
a drug-exposed infant arose from a charge of delivery of a con-
trolled substance to a minor.5 Jennifer Johnson, a 23-year-old co-
caine addict, was convicted in July, 1989, in Sanford, Florida, of
having delivered cocaine to her daughter, Jessica Nicole Johnson,
through her still-pulsing umbilical cord, in the sixty seconds after
Jessica's birth, on January 23, 1989.52 Johnson was acquitted of a
second charge of child abuse. Although she could have received a
30-year prison sentence, Johnson was sentenced to fifteen months
for Expanded Outreach; Some Programs Deny Women Treatment, 33 Blue Sheet (Drug Re-
search Reports) 7 (1990), citing a 1990 survey by the General Accounting Office which found
that while 280,000 pregnant women in the United States needed drug treatment, less than
SI% could find it. The survey noted that "concerns over legal liability" prompted many drug
treatment programs to turn away pregnant women.
49. Criminal statutes specifically aimed at the problem of prenatal maternal drug use
have been and are currently being reviewed by a number of states. One bill, considered and
tabled in committee in Ohio last year, called for felony prosecution of women who delivered
drug-impaired children, and included provisions for both mandatory and voluntary steriliza-
tion for drug dependent women, depending on the nature of the charges. Don't Punish the
Troubled Mothers, Legal Times, May 21, 1990, at 20. In addition, several states-including
Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island-have amended their definitions of child
abuse to include drug use during pregnancy. Webb, Treatment Rather Than Jail Urged For
Pregnant Drug Abusers, United Press Int'l., May 17, 1990. For an excellent overview on the
status of the many attempts to pass specific legislation dealing with the problem of drug-
impaired fetuses and infants, see Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse"
An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401 (1990).
50. Where citations to case numbers are unavailable, citations to newspaper and maga-
zine articles are made.
51. State v. Johnson, Case No. E89-890-CFA (Cir. Ct. Seminole Cty. 1989); Davidson,
Newborn Drug Exposure Conviction a "Drastic" First, L.A. Times, July 31, 1989, at I, col. 1.
52. Davidson, supra note 51.
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probation and completion of a drug treatment program. 53
Jeff Deen, Seminole County Assistant State Attorney, called the
case "a good test." 4 He said that he had been looking for a way to
prosecute the growing number of women delivering drug-exposed
babies in his counties and chose Johnson because she previously had
given birth to two other drug-exposed babies. 5 Johnson unwit-
tingly aided in her prosecution by applying to enter a treatment
center (she was refused because of a fear her fetus would not survive
withdrawal) and twice telling emergency room doctors that she was
an addict who feared for her fetus. 6
The statute Johnson was convicted of violating was written with
the intention of prosecuting drug dealers. But Judge O.H. Eaton
said that it was his belief that use of the statute was appropriate "to
establish that pregnant women have a responsibility to their unborn
children."5"
In January, 1990, Beverly Black of Pensacola became the first
Florida woman to be sentenced to prison for distributing cocaine to
her newborn child.58 Black was convicted of passing cocaine to her
son on September 19, 1989, through the umbilical cord, after she
admitting to snorting cocaine in hopes of inducing labor.59 She was
sentenced to eighteen months in prison and three years probation.'
In Massachusetts on August 21, 1989, Josephine Pellegrini, of
Brockton, was arrested and charged with delivering cocaine to a
minor." Pellegrini's son, Nathan, was born healthy on July 2, but
with traces of cocaine in his urine.6" Pellegrini claimed she used
cocaine only twice, the last time at a party two days before the birth
of her son.63 The woman faced a minimum three-year prison sen-
tence, if convicted; however, Judge Suzanne V. DelVecchio dis-
missed the charge, ruling that it violated Pellegrini's right to
privacy. 64
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. I.
57. Id.
58. Jailed Mom Passed Coke to Unborn, Wheeling Intelligencer, Jan. 5, 1990.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970 (Super. CL Plymouth Cty., Mass. 1990);
Coakley & Richard, Mother Charged With Exposing Fetus to Cocaine, Boston Globe, Aug.
22, 1989, (Metro) at 1.
62. Coakley & Richard, supra note 61.
63. Id
64. Woman Cleared in Drug Case, Wash. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at B8. In the judge's 16-
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In Michigan, defense attorney Lynn Ellen Bremer was charged
with drug trafficking for allegedly manufacturing and delivering less
than fifty grams of cocaine derivative to her daughter in the seconds
after her birth on April 10, 1990.65 The charges against Bremer
were filed concurrently with identical charges against another
Michigan woman, Kimberly Hardy, who admitted to smoking
crack cocaine hours before delivering her son two months prema-
turely on August 20, 1989.66 The charges against Bremer were dis-
missed on February 4, 1991, when Judge Thomas Eveland ruled
that the law under which Bremer was charged was not intended to
apply to mothers who use illegal substances during their
pregnancies.67 On April 1, 1991, Judge William B. Murphy of the
Michigan Court of Appeals ruled to drop the charges against Ms.
Hardy.6" The legislature did not intend to target pregnant women
who take controlled substances.6 9
In a third Michigan case, against Cheryl Cox, a charge identical
to the one filed against Bremer was thrown out by a judge who
ruled that the decision to criminalize prenatal maternal behavior
should be made by the state legislature instead of prosecutors using
existing drug laws.7'
Finally, in North Carolina, Sandra Inzar is awaiting trial on her
indictment for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor and
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, inflicting seriousinjury.71 Inzar allegedly smoked crack the day before she gave
birth to her daughter on Aug. 3, 1989, causing premature labor and
severe brain damage to the child.72 The trafficking charge carries a
page ruling, she wrote that "there is no familiar bond more intimate and more fundamental
than that between the mother and the fetus she carries in her womb." Id.
65. Warren, Judge Orders Lawyer to Stand Trial in Cocaine-Baby Case, United Press
Int'l., July 18, 1990 (wire copy).
66. People v. Hardy, No. 89-2931-FY (60th Dist. Ct., Muskegon Cty., Mich. 1989)
LExis, States Library, Mich. file; Trial to Start on Case of Baby Born Addicted to Drugs,
United Press Int'l., May 28, 1990 (wire copy).
67. Judge Drops Charges of Delivering Drugs to an Unborn Baby, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,
1991, at B6, col. 4. The judge also ruled that the charges violated her right to privacy "by
intruding into her relationship with her fetus without a compelling reason to do so," and
violated her due process rights because she had no notice that the law under which she was
charged could apply to her behavior. Id
68. People v. Hardy, No. 128458 (Ct. App. Mich. April 1, 1991).
69. Charges Dropped Against Cocaine Mother, Prosecutor Vows Appeal, United Press
Int'l., Feb. 5, 1991 (wire copy).
70. Warren, supra note 65.
71. Mother Faces Drug Charges in Baby's Birth, United Press Int'l., April 18, 1990 (wire
copY).
72. Id
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maximum penalty of thirty years in prison, while the assault charge
carries a maximum of twenty years. 73
B. Feticide/Homicide
In a very early case, the details of which are unclear, Deborah
Wright, a 26-year-old woman from Westville, New Jersey, pleaded
guilty on September 21, 1982, to a charge of manslaughter after she
admitted that her use of drugs during her pregnancy caused the
death of her infant.7 4 Of interest in this case is the fact that both
Wright and the child's father were indicted on manslaughter
charges after their four-month-old son died in September, 198 1.7
The boy's death was attributed to "failure to thrive." Wright faced
up to ten years in prison.76 The final disposition of this case is
unknown.
Melanie Green, a 24-year-old woman from Rockford, Illinois,
was charged on May 8, 1989, with involuntary manslaughter and
supplying drugs to a minor after her daughter, Bianca, died two
days after birth from oxygen deprivation prenatally caused by
Green's use of cocaine.7 7 Less than three weeks later, on May 26, a
grand jury refused to indict Green for the crime.7 8
In July, 1989, Elizabeth Levey, a 29-year-old Massachusetts wo-
man, was charged with vehicular homicide after she allegedly drove
while under the influence of alcohol and ran her car into a tree.79
Her near fvll-term fetus was stillborn the following day. Levey was
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in March,
1987.80 If convicted on the vehicular homicide charge, Levey faced
up to fifteen years in prison. The charge was dropped in March,
1990.81
In 1984, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Com-
monwealth v. Cass, held that a viable fetus is a person for purposes
73. Id.
74. National News Briefs, United Press Int'l., Sept. 22, 1982 (wire copy).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Kreiter, Cocaine Mothers and Cocaine Babies, United Press Int'l., May 27, 1989
(wire copy).
78. Id.
79. Commonwealth v. Levey, No. 89-2725-2729 (Super. Ct. Mass. 1989); Daly, Woman
Charged in Death of Own Fetus in Accident" Massachusetts Vehicular Homicide Case a First,
Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1989, at 4.
80. Daly, supra note 79.
81. Jackson, Inequality and the 'Fetal Rights' Concept, Boston Globe, March 25, 1990,
at A24.
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of the vehicular homicide statute.8 2 However, the Levey case was
the first anywhere in the country where a woman has been charged
with vehicular homicide in the death of the fetus she was carrying.
8 3
C. Fetus Abuse/Neglect
Pamela Rae Stewart, a 27-yeac-old El Cajon, California, woman
was charged in October, 1986 with failure to provide medical care
for her fetus through her alleged taking of drugs during her preg-
nancy and failing to obey her doctor's orders, which included absti-
nence from sexual relations with her husband." She was charged
under an obscure "child abuse" statute intended to ensure child
support payments to women carrying their ex-husbands' fetuses.8"
Stewart suffered from placenta previa. When her son was born in
November, 1985, he lacked brain activity, but was maintained on
life support systems until January 1, 1986.16 Notably, traces of
methamphetamine were found in the boy's system at birth. 7
The crime with which Stewart was charged was a misdemeanor
and carried the stipulation that, for purposes of the statute, a child
conceived but not yet born was a person.88 The municipal court
judge dismissed the charge after finding that the California legisla-
ture intended the law to be used solely for child support purposes
and not to "impose a duty upon the pregnant woman."89 Stewart
would have faced a maximum sentence of one year in jail and a
$2,000 fine had she been convicted. She spent a week in jail before
obtaining bail.90
82. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 807 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (1984). Two
other state supreme courts have held that a viable fetus is not a "human being" within the
meanings of the states' homicide statutes. Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 2 Cal.
3d 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. Trudell, 243 Kan. 29, 755 P.2d 511
(1988).
83. Daly, supra note 79. Four states have feticide statutes. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80
(1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Bums 1979); IOWA CODE § 707.7 (1989); 1989 LA.
AcTs 777. However, the language of the Georgia and Louisiana statutes precludes their use
against the mother of the destroyed fetus. The Georgia statute applies only to deaths of
fetuses caused during the murder or attempted murder of the mother. The Louisiana act
requires that the offending act, procurement, or omission be committed by a person "other
than the mother of the unborn child."
84. State v. Stewart, Civ. No. 3575396 (Mun. Ct. Cal., San Diego County, 1987); (No
title), United Press Int'l., Feb. 26, 1987 (wire copy).
85. No title, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
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On August 1, 1989, in Middleton, Connecticut, Nellie Baez was
arrested and charged with causing a risk of injury to a minor, her
four-month-old fetus.91 The charge arose when Baez swallowed a
quarter-ounce of cocaine as she was being arrested in late July.92
Baez was hospitalized, but both she and the fetus apparently were
unharmed. The chief state's attorney said he doubted the charge
would stand, since Connecticut state case law holds that a fetus is
not a person.93
In Ohio, a prosecutor is continuing his more than three-year
battle to convict Tammy Gray of endangering the health of her
newborn baby.94 Gray was first indicted in March 1987, after she
and her baby tested positive for cocaine.95 An appeals court, how-
ever, dismissed the charge because recklessness had not been al-
leged.96 Prosecutor Anthony Pizza has vowed to take the case to
the state supreme court, attempting to argue that the child endan-
gering occurred in the ninety seconds after birth, prior to cutting
the umbilical cord.9 7
In May, 1990, Bonnie Welch O'Neal of Kentucky, was sen-
tenced to five years in prison for her conviction on a criminal abuse
charge.98 O'Neal, who had been addicted for seventeen years, most
recently to Percodan and Dilaudid, two powerful painkillers, was
criminally charged when her son went into withdrawal after being
born in December, 1989.11
Two Nevada women were charged in February, 1990, with child
abuse due to their use of drugs prior to delivery of their babies.1°
Regina Mae Bloxham allegedly used methamphetamine two days
before her daughter was born Nov. 10, 1989.101 Another woman,
whose name is unavailable, was charged after cocaine and mari-
juana were found in the urine of her newly born son on Dec. 10,
91. Drug Abuser Arrestedfor Endangering Fetus, Wash. Times, Aug. 11, 1989, § B, at 8.
92. Id
93. Id
94. Sielicki, Appeals Court Tosses Out Cocaine Baby Case, United Press Int'l., Aug. 31,
1990 (wire copy).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Junkie Moms, supra note 1.
99. I d; see also NIGHTLn: Jailing Pregnant Drug Users Does It Help or Hurt? (ABC
television broadcast, June 19, 1990).
100. Miller, Charges Filed Against Drug Mothers, Gannett News Serv., Feb. 10, 1990
(wire copy).
101. Id
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In addition to these specifically named cases, prosecutors in two
South Carolina counties and in Clark County, Nevada, have
charged more than three dozen women with child abuse, alleging
prenatal maternal drug use.1"3
In a first case of its kind, Diane Pfannenstiel, a 29-year-old wo-
man from Laramie, Wyoming, on January 2, 1990, was charged
with felony child abuse for drinking alcohol during her preg-
nancy. 1" She was four months pregnant at the time the charges
were filed. Pfannenstiel was under a court order not to drink during
her pregnancy, as she previously had given birth to a FAS child. 105
The charges were filed after she fled her home and attempted to file
a complaint of domestic battery against her husband. 1 6 In the pro-
cess of having her bruises photographed at the police station and
being given medical treatment at the hospital, Pfannenstiel was
tested for alcohol consumption and arrested."0 7
The charge against Pfannenstiel was dismissed a week later be-
cause the prosecutor failed to prove that her drinking had harmed
the fetus.108 The court did not rule out the possibility that charges
could be refied should Pfannenstiel deliver another FAS baby1°9;
however, Pfannenstiel subsequently delivered "an apparently
healthy boy." 110
D. Preventive Detention
In one of only a few nationally publicized cases of preventive
detention111, Brenda A. Vaughan was sentenced to six months in
jail by a District of Columbia Superior Court judge solely on the
102. IM
103. Some States Taking Action, USA Today, Feb. 26, 1990, at 3A.
104. Beck, Womb Not a Haven for the Babies of Women Who Drink, Chi. Tribune, Feb.
8, 1990, Perspective, at 23.
105. Id.
106. Goodman, Being Pregnant, Addicted: It's a Crime, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 11, 1990,
Tempo, at 12.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Fetal Alcohol Case, supra note 43.
111. It is unlikely that preventive detention is as rare as its reporting. Davidson, Preg-
nant Addicts: Drug Babies Push Issue of Fetal Rights, L.A. Times, April 25, 1989, at 1, col. 1
(quoting Judge Peter H. Wolf, who sentenced Brenda Vaughan to jail for the duration of her
pregnancy, regarding preventive detention for pregnant addicts: "It happens all the time. A
lot of my colleagues on the bench said to me, 'Why didn't you just lock her up and keep your
mouth shut?' I don't think that's intellectually honest."). Two other instances of preventive
detention have been reported, one in Charleston, S.C., and the other in Hawaii. Witt, (No
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basis of her pregnancy.1 12 Vaughan was arrested February 5, 1988,
on a felony check-forging charge, and pleaded guilty to a lesser
charge of second-degree theft. At her May 24 sentencing, Vaughan
revealed that she was pregnant and was ordered to take a drug test,
which returned positive for cocaine. 13
Ignoring the state's agreement that Vaughan should receive pro-
bation, Judge Peter H. Wolf sentenced her to six months in jail,
subject to a motion for time reduction after her baby was born.114
Three months later, after the mayor issued an emergency order to
reduce the sentences of prisoners because of overcrowding in the
jails of the jurisdiction, Wolf stayed the release of only one prisoner:
Vaughan. 1 Vaughan was released from jail one day before her
baby was born, on September 15, 1988.116
V. NO COMMON GROUND: TWO MUTUALLY-
EXCLUSIVE RESPONSES TO
CRIMINALIZATION OF PRENATAL
MATERNAL BEHAVIOR
Legal commentators writing on the issue of criminalizing prena-
tal maternal behavior generally have fallen into one of two diametri-
cally opposing camps: those supporting the concept of state-defined
and mandated behavior for pregnant women and those to whom the
idea is an anathema. Although each side presents a panoply of ra-
tionales and benefits for its stance, undergirding all the arguments is
a fundamental disagreement about the existence and extent of a
pregnant woman's right to personal autonomy and integrity. This
section compares the arguments of two commentators, John A.
Robertson, a professor of law at the University of Texas, and Molly
McNulty, an attorney who specializes in the area of reproductive
rights.117
A. Robertson: A Duty to Deliver "Whole" Babies
Robertson argues that a woman has, "if she conceives and
title), Gannett News Serv., Feb. 14, 1990 (wire copy); Hawaii, USA Today, Aug. 24, 1990
(wire copy).
112. Davidson, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Specifically, this section compares the arguments presented in Robertson's article,
Procreative Liberty, supra note 22, and McNulty's article, Pregnancy Police, supra note 23.
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chooses not to abort, a legal and moral duty to bring the child into
the world as healthy as is reasonably possible." '118 This duty may
include abstinence from drugs, alcohol, and tobacco; appropriate
intake of necessary medication; avoidance of toxic substances or en-
vironments; and submission to tests and surgery for fetal therapy. 19
Robertson suggests that the requirements of this duty can be en-
forced by the state through child abuse, feticide, or abortion laws. 120
In support of his view that there is an enforceable duty to de-
liver healthy babies, Robertson attacks constitutional critics on four
levels. First, he writes, while "[flull freedom in procreation in-
cludes a woman's freedom to make the myriad decisions she faces in
gestating and giving birth to the child ... ," it is possible to distin-
guish "management" of a woman's pregnancy from the true right to
freedom of procreation.121 This can be accomplished by redefining
behavior and choices during pregnancy as impacting only upon
bodily integrity, not upon procreative rights. 22 This redefinition is
vitally important to Robertson's proposals, because it shields
criminalization of prenatal maternal behavior from the "strict scru-
tiny" required where procreative freedom is implicated.123
To complete this line of reasoning, Robertson intertwines the
second of his arguments with his first:
Restrictions on pregnancy management may significantly limit a
woman's freedom of action and even lead to forcible bodily intru-
sions to protect the unborn child. But they do not affect her de-
cision to procreate. She has already exercised her right to
procreate by conceiving and has waived her right not to procre-
ate by failing to abort the fetus prior to viability. Although she is
under no obligation to invite the fetus in or to allow it to remain,
once she has done these things she assumes obligations to the
fetus that limit her freedom over her body.1
24
Thus, Robertson contends not only that regulating a pregnant wo-
man's behavior does not interfere with her right to procreate, but
that although it does interfere with her right to bodily integrity and
autonomy, she waives those rights by continuing to carry the
118. Procreative Liberty, supra note 22, at 438.
119. Id at 443 and 445.
120. Id. at 443.
121. Id. at 437.
122. Id. ("The maternal-fetal conflicts that arise in managing pregnancy do not involve
the woman's right to procreate, but rather her right to bodily integrity in the course of
procreating. Whereas restrictions on conception would prevent a woman from using her
physiological capacity to reproduce, restrictions on her conduct during pregnancy only affect
how she will behave in carrying the child to term.").
123. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
124. Procreative Liverty, supra note 22, at 437-38.
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fetus. 125
Subsidiary to the first two of Robertson's assertions, are two
others: That a woman has no fundamental right to use illegal drugs
and, therefore, a state need not show a compelling reason for re-
stricting their use; and, that even use of legal substances, such as
alcohol or tobacco, can be restricted for health reasons under a "ra-
tional basis" test.126 These are consistent with Robertson's conten-
tion that something less than "strict scrutiny" is applicable to
infringements on a woman's management of her pregnancy (as dis-
tinguished from procreative decisions).
Robertson completes his analysis by offering his "balancing" of
the interests involved in criminalization of prenatal maternal behav-
ior. As Constitutional scholars often say, it is not that there is a
balancing that is important, but who is doing the balancing. In that
regard, it is interesting to note Robertson's choice of language when
arguing that various types of prenatal maternal behavior should be
regulated. To reach a totally unsurprising conclusion that a preg-
nant woman should be required to submit to invasive fetal therapy,
on pain of criminal penalty, Robertson balances the needs of the
fetus against "eccentric preferences, idiosyncratic weightings of the
values at issue, fear of surgery, or a desire to avoid the responsibili-
ties of parenting" by the woman.127 Likewise not surprising is Rob-
ertson's conclusion that a pregnant woman should be required to
submit to compulsory surgery for the benefit of the fetus, since he
finds such surgery merely "distasteful" to the woman and incredi-
bly, and without any medical citation, declares that "the physical
burden on her of the mandatory cesarean section is not nearly as
great as the burden of abdominal surgery on a nonpregnant
woman."
128
It is clear that under Robertson's "rational basis" analysis of the
interests involved in regulation of prenatal maternal behavior, bol-
stered by his concept of "waiver" of a woman's rights to bodily
integrity and autonomy by way of pregnancy, there are few, if any,
state intrusions upon a pregnant woman that Robertson would find
violative of her rights.
125. Id at 445-57 Robertson seems to envision a state of voluntary servitude, entered into
when a woman becomes pregnant and fails to abort the fetus. At that point, the woman "has
chosen to lend her body to bring the child into the world," and in doing so, "waive[s] her
right to resist bodily intrusions made for the sake of the fetus." Id
126. Id at 442.
127. Id. at 445.
128. Id. at 456-57.
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B. McNulty: Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal Behavior
Is Bad Law
McNulty rejects criminalization of prenatal maternal behavior
as unworkable from a health policy perspective and as unconstitu-
tional, in that such state action violates prohibitions on vagueness,
infringes on a woman's right to liberty, and denies a woman the
equal protection of the law. 29
McNulty's first argument is one of fairness and futility. She
contends that "[t]he population at which 'fetal abuse' statutes and
other punitive action are targeted tend to be the victims of neglect
of our health care system, often on the fringes of society, beyond the
reach of concerned health care workers."130 Furthermore, while
criminalization of reckless or negligent behavior "would result in a
strict liability crime that would disregard a woman's economic situ-
ation, personal values, and individual health needs," a narrowly tai-
lored statute based on intentional infliction of harm on a fetus by its
mother would fail to affect the majority of drug and alcohol-using
pregnant women, who abuse those substances because of addiction
and not to harm their fetuses.13 1
Turning to the Constitutional issues involved, McNulty con-
tends that statutes aimed at criminalization of prenatal maternal be-
havior would, because of inherent vagueness, "suffer from the same
constitutional infirmities which have rendered invalid the disorderly
conduct and vagrancy laws of a number of jurisdictions."1 32 Mc-
Nulty argues that vagueness in the case of criminalizing behavior of
pregnant women "would give a police officer unlimited authority to
129. Pregnancy Police, supra note 23, at 318-19.
130. Id. at 318 (noting that low-income and minority women have limited access to pre-
natal care; that Medicaid is an inadequate safety net for women who live in poverty and get
pregnant; that most drug treatment centers will not accept pregnant addicts; and that prison
is not the appropriate environment in which to rehabilitate pregnant women).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 310. To escape a challenge of vagueness, "[a] criminal statute must define its
punishable offense in a sufficiently concrete manner to give adequate notice of what conduct
is prohibited or required." Id. As an example of one problem of vagueness, McNulty points
to a New York decision, in which the court rejected the state's contention that a newborn
with withdrawal symptoms had been "actually impaired" within the meaning of the state
child abuse statute. That court found that because "it is clear that a child in utero may be
endangered or actually harmed by a broad range of conduct on the part of a pregnant wo-
man, it would appear necessary to limit any application of the neglect statute to prenatal
maternal conduct to a narrow and clearly defined class of cases. It may be possible to identify
some cases in which it is common knowledge that the maternal conduct in question creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to the fetus. However, even a 'knew or should have known'
standard may prove difficult to administer." Id. citing In re Male R, 102 Misc. 2d 1, 10 n.18,
422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fain. Ct. 1979).
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decide when a pregnant-looking woman is doing something that in
the officer's judgment might harm the fetus .... . Vagueness
also lends itself to discriminatory enforcement, McNulty writes, be-
cause low-income women are more likely to be in contact with vari-
ous agencies of the government and, thus, are more likely to be
reported for endangering their fetuses.
134
McNulty argues that criminalization of prenatal maternal be-
havior implicates the fundamental right to privacy, including the
right to bodily integrity, the right of parental authority against the
state, and the right to make procreative decisions. 135 Finding a fun-
damental right at stake, McNulty contends that the required "strict
scrutiny" would render any such statute unconstitutional. Addi-
tionally, criminalization of a pregnant woman's behavior "would
hold women to a much higher standard of self-care than men and
would infringe upon women's rights to autonomous decision-mak-
ing in a manner not required of men," thus violating women's right
to equal protection of the law.136
VI. REJECTING THE EXTREMES: A MIDDLE GROUND
INTERPRETATION
The magnitude of the interests involved in the question of
criminalization of prenatal maternal behavior urges a rejection of
the shrillness of the extremes and an attempt to discover a middle
ground upon which a partial or whole solution may be engraved. In
order to find that area of possible consensus, the following argu-
ments are presented.
Procreation, or the bringing forth of offspring, is a continuum.
Conception cannot be distinguished from the "management" of the
pregnancy, nor from the birthing of a baby. Each is an integral part
of the whole, and that whole is protected as a fundamental right by
our Constitution. 137
133. Pregnancy Police, supra note 23 at 311.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 314.
136. Id. at 316-17 McNulty notes that biological differences "have long been used as
justification for oppression of women," and contends that "Is]tate policing of pregnancy rests
on the implicit assumption that women are less than fully moral beings who have no in-
dependent judgment." Id Finally, she argues that "romantic paternalism" damages both
women, through discrimination, and their fetuses, because placing the blame on women shifts
the focus from other factors which play a part in producing damaged children. Id.
137. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (Included as a part
of the fundamental right of privacy are "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (the Fourteenth
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The right to exercise a fundamental right is however, not abso-
lute. A state may regulate the exercise of a fundamental right
where it can demonstrate that the law is necessary, is narrowly tai-
lored, and responds to a compelling state interest.1 38 Furthermore,
under Roe v. Wade 139, the state is allowed to balance the potential-
ity of life against the interests of a woman in exercising her procrea-
tive choice (by obtaining an abortion) in the third trimester of her
pregnancy. Even in the third trimester, however, the United States
Supreme Court found that the life and health of the mother out-
weighs that of the fetus she carries.14
The duty of a woman to refrain from harming the fetus she has
decided to carry to term arises logically from the right of procrea-
tion protected by the Constitution. If a woman were no more than
a reproductive "challis," denied the right to decide whether or not
to bear a child, state interference in her pregnancy would amount to
discrimination based on reproductive capacity alone and would be a
violation of the woman's right to equal treatment under the law.
However, once a woman has availed herself of her right to make
procreative choices, and has decided to carry her fetus to term, the
state may claim an interest in the potentiality of that fetus at some
point in its development. If the state asserts that interest and in-
trudes on the privacy and personal autonomy of the pregnant wo-
man, the focus then shifts to balancing those interests.
A. The "Five-Step" Balancing Analysis
Deborah Mathieu has proposed a thoughtful five-step analysis
for balancing maternal autonomy with fetal needs. 4 The first step
requires a review of the severity and duration of harm to the future
child by the maternal behavior and to the pregnant woman by the
state intervention. The second step is consideration of the value of
the interests involved. The third step is an assessment of the
probability of the harm to the fetus by the maternal conduct. The
fourth step is an assessment of the probability that the harm can be
Amendment's guarantee of liberty extends beyond those rights specifically detailed in the
Constitution and includes "those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. . . (such that) neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.' ")).
138. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983).
139. 410 U.S. at 165.
140. Id. Nor did the court reject that opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
141. Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm Limits of State Intervention in
Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 50-52 (1985).
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prevented or ameliorated by the state action. The final step is con-
sideration of proportionality; that is, whether the state action will
create more harm than it prevents.142
In the case of prenatal maternal use of alcohol and drugs, the
analysis may be as follows: First, the severity is great and the dura-
tion long for harm to the future child. However, harm to the wo-
man is not insignificant, in that her freedom and autonomy are
curtailed and she is inducted into the criminal justice system, a pro-
cess which has severe and long-term consequences in and of itself.
However, curtailing the length of time in which the state legiti-
mately could involve itself in prenatal maternal decisions, providing
for diversion to non-penal settings after intervention, and expunge-
ment of the woman's criminal record would in part mitigate the
harm to the woman.
In the second step of the analysis, the value of the interest of a
future person in being born free of biological impairment is bal-
anced against the woman's interest in personal freedom, autonomy,
and bodily integrity. Neither of these interests is amenable to accu-
rate description; the value of each is immeasurable.143 Again, how-
ever, limiting the duration of the intrusion and consequences of the
intervention could tip the scales in favor of intervention.
The third and fourth steps (assessment of the probability of
harm and of prevention or amelioration) recognize the need care-
fully to limit the maternal activities regulated. The probability that
alcohol and drug abuse during pregnancy will cause harm has been
verified empirically. Likewise, the probability that cessation of the
behavior (if it is accomplished within a structured plan with aware-
ness of the special needs of a pregnant addict) will at least amelio-
rate the harm to the future child also has been established. In
contrast, the argument of some commentators that a vast array of
maternal behavior (including failure to take vitamins, to control
weight gain, or to be judicious in coffee drinking) falls under the
designation of prenatal maternal "duties," and that the violation of
those "duties" should give rise to legal recourse 1", clearly fails
under this step of the analysis in combination with the first step.
142. Id.
143. Some commentators assert that the only maternal interest implicated is that of
drinking or using illegal drugs and, thus, any interest of the fetus, from the moment of con-'
ception, would outweigh the interest of the woman. Procreative Liberty, supra note 22, at 442-
43. This argument is fatuous, because it ignores the very real (and recognized) interest in"
being "let alone." Botsford, 141 U.S. 250. This interest is no weaker in a pregnant woman
than in any other citizen of the United States.
144. Shaw, supra note 36, at 73.
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None of these activities has been proven to cause probable severe
and long-term harm to the fetus that would justify the inordinate
amount of state intervention it would take to monitor and coerce
women into the "correct" behavior.
Finally, the analysis of the proportionality of the intervention in
pregnant women's lives leads to the conclusion that, for the dura-
tion of the pregnancy, incarcerating a woman in jail or prison
causes more harm than it prevents and, therefore, should be ex-
cluded from any proposed statute.145 Furthermore, criminal sanc-
tions should be written so as to give the woman, even following
delivery of her child, every opportunity for rehabilitation and, if the
circumstances allow, reunification with her offspring.
VII. CONCLUSION
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the
continent, a part of the main; ... any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to
know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. 1"
Donne's words ring no clearer than when applied to the rela-
tionship that develops between a pregnant woman and the late-term
fetus which grows within her. From our increasing knowledge of
that relationship springs all manner of vitriolic disputes concerning
the degree to which a woman may be held responsible for harm
arising from her connectedness with her fetus.
In this country, the dream of freedom, heavy-laden with notions
of individualism, self-reliance, and self-determination, overshadows
the law as it touches in its many ways the lives of people. However,
personal freedom is never uncircumscribed. As the old adage
teaches, a person may swing his arms at will only so long as another
person's nose is not in the way. Anglo-American law, however, pri-
marily male-centric and male-promulgated, is ill-endowed for the
challenge of deciphering the intimate interconnectedness in the
pregnant relationship and determining how best to protect the
state's interest in potential human lives without destroying the core
of self-determination which is essential to every person's freedom.
For the most part, the legal commentators who have written
their reasoned opinions on the issue of gestational responsibility
have served only to embitter the argument. On the one hand, com-
mentators such as Robertson and Shaw shock and terrify even the
145. See supra notes 27 and 30.
146. DONNE, DEVOTIONS, XVII (1623).
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lukewarm libertarian by prescribing a world in which women would
be obligated-under threat of civil or criminal sanctions-to bear
perfect children.1 47 On the other hand, a host of commentators join
McNulty in arguing that criminalizing gestational behavior violates
women's right to self-determination and bodily integrity, casting
pregnant women in the role of human incubators. 148 The most rad-
ical of these latter commentators argue that a woman owes no duty
to the fetus she conceives and bears until and unless it takes its first
breath outside her body.
Each of these opposing views, in its own way, denies pregnant
women the rights accorded the population as a whole. The first
view would, from the mid-point of each menstrual cycle, sub-
liminate all fertile women's desires and dreams to the greater goal of
producing perfect babies. There is no doubt that this view does as
its critics claim-designates fertile women primarily as human incu-
bators or two-legged wombs.
The second view, however, is equally corrosive of women's place
in the world as full-fledged citizens. It presupposes that women are
weak, that they should be excused from the responsibilities that ac-
company every right. Assuming, as the following model legislation
does, that women will continue to have the right to seek birth con-
trol and abortion, it is insulting to suggest that they are incapable-
physically, mentally, morally, or spiritually-of picking up the
mantle of responsibility that necessarily falls on those who chose to
become pregnant or remain pregnant by choice. To expect less of
women in the way of shouldering responsibilities which are concur-
rent with the most precious of rights is, in its own way, the greatest
example of sexism. One only has to look to the law and the other
groups of people so shielded from responsibility-the mentally de-
fective and children-to recognize the obvious denigration.
Babies do not arrive full-blown from the cabbage patch. They
are conceived and grow to infancy within women. Nowhere else in
the experience of humankind is there a greater connectedness, a
greater impact upon one life (potential though it may be) by an-
other. When pregnancy is uncoerced, and/or its termination is rea-
sonably available to women, there is no reason to excuse pregnant
women from the responsibility not to use personal freedom as a tool
of destruction.
147. These commentators' ideas are fully discussed in the section titled "Robertson: A
Duty to Deliver "Whole Babies" at pp 120-122.
148. The commentators' ideas are fully discussed in the section titled "McNulty:
Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal Behavior is Bad Law," at pp 122-123.
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It is time to take a closer look at gestational responsibilities
which may or should be required of any woman who decides to
conceive or maintains her pregnancy to a certain point. It also is
time for less rancor and more reason; for a recognition that a preg-
nant woman is neither a human incubator nor a dispassionate by-
stander, but rather a fully sentient being capable of understanding
and responding to the requirements of her delicate relationship with
the future child she is carrying.
VIII. PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF MODEL LEGISLATION
Charge:
Reckless injury and/or endangerment of a post-28-week-old fe-
tus by use of alcohol or drugs.
COMMENT: This model statute, on its face, is self-limiting.
Only reckless, not negligent, behavior on the part of the pregnant
woman will bring her within the statute's purview. This will cur-
tail attempts to enlarge the circle of prohibited activities beyond
those which not only are empirically established to be harmful to
a fetus, but also are known to be harmful by a reasonable adult
person. However, the statute also contains a flavor of strict lia-
bility, because apparent injury does not have to be proven in or-
der to charge a woman under this statute, as long as the
empirical evidence is clear and convincing and a reasonable per-
son would have notice of that evidence.
Specifics:
Two applicable stages of pregnancy: Prosecution under this
statute may be carried out at either of two stages in the procreative
process: post-28 weeks, but prior to birth; or immediately post-
birth.
COMMENT: This statute specifically rejects the "quickening,"
"viability," and "born alive" rules14 9 as triggers for charging a
woman who uses drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. Due to the
scientific advances of the past several decades, none of these stan-
dards operates as an appropriate indicator of potential per-
sonhood. Rather, the statute adopts "brain birth"'150 as the
149. See supra notes 37-38.
150. Patlak, Does the Birth of the Brain Begin a Life?, Oregonian, March 22, 1990, Sc.,
at 1, col. 1 "Fueled by the latest findings on fetal development, some scientists say 'brain
birth' in the fetus should mark the beginning of human life, just as 'brain death' already is
used to signal the end of a life." "Brain birth" is defined as the threshold in fetal develop-
ment, starting at about the 28th week, in which the connections between the neurons in all
parts of the neocortex are made, and the neocortex is "turned on," enabling the fetus to
develop into a thinking, speakingv fully-aware person. This approach also takes some support
from the statistics that show that despite the increasingly sophisticated tools of neonatology,
the mortality and long-term morbidity for infants of less than twenty-six weeks gestation or
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threshold trigger for state intervention into prenatal maternal
behavior.
In addition, this statute also may be triggered by evidence
produced at the birth of a child, i.e., withdrawal or other symp-
toms of drug or alcohol impairment. The timing of these triggers
for implementation of this statute takes into account the delicate
balance between a woman's right to privacy and personal auton-
omy and her child's right to be born unimpaired. It is acknowl-
edged that the triggering points drawn here will neither prevent
nor ameliorate all harm to all fetuses. However, we lose much
more than we gain if, in our search for "whole" babies, we fail to
give adequate weight to the profound interests women have in
their right to be "let alone." The 28-week trigger offers two ben-
efits. It allows for prevention of the worst of the harm done to a
fetus by drugs and alcohol1 5 1, and it pays respect to the woman's
procreative choices by not assuming "waiver" of those choices
before the fetus assumes potential personhood (under the "brain
birth" standard).
Causation:
Causation of harm to the fetus or newly born child to substanti-
ate charges brought under this statute can be established in either
of two ways:
1.) For post-28-week fetuses, evidence of use of either alcohol
or drugs, in amounts shown empirically to cause harm to a fetus, is
adequate to establish causation.
2.) For newly born babies, causation will be established if:
a.) Quantitative analysis of the infant's blood reveals levls
of alcohol or drugs that hold the potential for severe and long-term
harm to the child; or
b.) the child displays signs and symptoms which can be diag-
nosed as those caused by prenatal exposure to drugs or alcohol.
COMMENT: In order to facilitate the prevention and ameliora-
tion of harm to fetuses, causation of harm in a post-28-week fetus
will be presumed if the evidence shows that the pregnant mother
has consumed alcohol or drugs in qualities proven to cause sub-
750 grams remain virtually unchanged. Hodgman, Neonatology, 263 J. A.M.A. 2656, 2657
(1990).
151. See Skolnick, supra note I ("Among the women who initially tested positive for drug
use, those who stopped using drugs had babies with significantly greater birth weights and
head circumferences than the babies of patients who continued abusing drugs."); Skolnick,
Cocaine Use in Pregnancy: Physicians Urged to Look for Problem Where They Least Expect It,
264 J. A.M.A. 306 (1990) ("Binge use of cocaine at the end of pregnancy puts the baby at
severe risk of in utero infarctions of the brain, the heart, and other organs, [Dr. Ira J.] Chas-
noff says"); Day, Richardson, Robles, Sambamoorthi, Taylor, Scher, Stoffer, Jasperse & Cor-
nelius, Effect of Prenatal Alcohol Exposure on Growth and Morphology of Offspring at 8
Months ofAge, 85 PEDIATRICS 748 (1990) (alcohol use through the second and third trimes-
ters of pregnancy is "significantly related to lower weight, length, and head circumference").
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stantial, long-term harm in most fetuses. To require direct evi-
dence of damage to a particular fetus in order to charge its
mother would render impossible the prevention or amelioration
of harm to unborn fetuses.
Reporting Requirement:
It shall be the duty of physicians and other health care workers
to report to the appropriate authorities properly documented evi-
dence that a woman who is post-28 weeks in pregnancy or who
newly has delivered is or has been abusing alcohol or certain illegal
drugs to the detriment of her fetus or child.
COMMENT: The requirement poses some of the same risks of
any reporting requirement, in that it to some extent requires doc-
tors to violate patient-physician confidentiality. However, as in
other public health and safety statutes which incorporate report-
ing requirements (i.e., communicable diseases or child abuse), the
interests of the post-28-week fetus or newborn child sufficiently
outweigh the interests of the mother in this limited context.
Recklessness Defined:
In order to fit within the definition of reckless as proposed by
this model legislation, the potential for injury to a fetus from a wo-
man's activity must be substantial. This can be shown by clear and
convincing empirical evidence to cause long-term or permanent in-
jury to most or all fetuses. The injury so shown must be severe, not
slight. 1
52
COMMENT: This definition prevents intrusion into a pregnant
woman's personal liberty absent a real and present danger to the
post-28-week fetus she is carrying. It is in answer to those who,
like Robertson, would validate regulation of a myriad of the de-
tails of everyday life for a pregnant woman. Although this defi-
nition allows a legislature to expand of the list of those
substances which may be proscribed, addition to that list is pro-
hibited unless the evidence mandates placing a limit on a wo-
man's right to manage her pregnancy as she sees fit.
Exclusions:
Specifically excluded from the definition of reckless are those
activities whose harm to the fetus is not supported by clear and
152. Under this definition, use of an illegal drug is not per se reckless, unless its use has
been established as harmful to the fetus. In this regard, it is unclear whether marijuana poses
a probable risk of severe and long-term harm to the fetus. Physicians conclude that mari-
juana is "nowhere near as damaging" as cocaine, but it is associated with low birth weights,
abnormal eye-hand coordination and visual problems. Kolata, Bias Seen Against Pregnant
Addicts, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at 13A, col. 1, quoting Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff. However,
until the probability of both severe and long-term harm unequivocally is demonstrated, mari-
juana would not be included within this statute. Likewise, see supra note 4, regarding the
hazards of smoking.
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convincing empirical evidence. Also specifically excluded from the
definition of reckless are those activities about which there may be
reasonable dispute among medical experts regarding their potential
for harm to fetuses.
COMMENT: Again, this exclusion reiterates the point that the
list of activities for which a pregnant woman may be subjected to
criminal penalties must be limited to those where the interests of
the fetus clearly outweigh the substantial maternal interests in
freedom of activity. If there is genuine differences of opinion
about the harm caused by certain substances, a pregnant woman
is not reckless in using such a substance.
A physician's advice, by itself, is not a basis for a determination
of recklessness, unless that advice fits within the definition above.
COMMENT: This statute does not legitimize physician control
of a pregnant woman's life through the paternalistic and anach-
ronistic belief that physicians always know best. It is the law in
this country that competent patients have the right to make med-
ical decisions for themselves. It is no less so for a pregnant
woman.
Mitigation:
If a pregnant woman voluntarily enters and remains in a treat-
ment program prior to being charged under this legislation, no pros-
ecution is allowed, provided that such a woman actually completes
that program. Proof that a woman attempted to enter a treatment
program and was refused is an affirmative defense to prosecution
under this legislation.
COMMENT: It is fundamentally unfair to penalize a woman
who has attempted the only means possible to avoid breaking a
law. This is especially true in the case of pregnant addicts, for
whose fetuses "cold turkey" withdrawal-the only alternative to
an organized treatment program-can mean death. This re-
quirement will give communities an incentive for making sure
that there is treatment available to all addicts who ask for it,
including pregnant women.
Prerequisites to this statute:
This legislation will become effective and remain in effect only
so long as women retain the right to decide whether to carry a fetus
to term. Furthermore, prior to effect of this statute, the state must
show that it has shouldered its responsibilities by providing access
to birth control and abortions for all women who desire them, in-
cluding financial access to birth control and abortions. 53
COMMENT: Recklessness connotes a conscious decision to
153. At present, only sixteen states will pay for an indigent woman's abortion; and only
eighteen percent of the counties in the United States have at least one provider of abortions.
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take a risk. In the case women charged under this statute, there
must be two decisions: the decision to bear a child (whether to
get pregnant or to maintain the pregnancy) and the decision to
take substances which will harm the fetus she is carrying. If the
woman is precluded by law from making a decision about be-
coming or maintaining her pregnancy, it is fundamentally unfair
to then further restrict her life for the duration of that involun-
tary pregnancy. Furthermore, this statute can maintain its con-
stitutionality under an equal protection analysis only if the basis
for criminalization is a choice to carry a fetus to term and not
merely a woman's reproductive capacity.
Despite what the United States Supreme Court has decided
of late, a woman has a choice regarding the bearing of children
only if she has the financial ability, along with the right, to termi-
nate her pregnancy. This statute recognizes that reality and
gives an incentive to the community to provide for a truly free
choice for women.
Sentencing:
1.) Pre-birth: Any woman charged and convicted under this
statute prior to the birth of her fetus will be diverted into an appro-
priate residential treatment program for the duration of her preg-
nancy. No woman convicted under this statute will be incarcerated
in a jail or prison. Due care should be taken to accommodate (by
way of family treatment centers) the familial needs of the woman so
diverted, including her responsibilities to other children.
COMMENT: Diversion of a pregnant woman to a treatment
center benefits both the woman and her fetus. She receives reha-
bilitation, and the damage to her fetus is prevented or amelio-
rated during the last twelve weeks of pregnancy. A woman so
diverted will not attempt to withdraw from her addiction "cold
turkey," and so the possible death of her fetus from such non-
treatment will be prevented. Finally, the woman's pregnancy
can be accommodated in the treatment center, unlike in a jail or
prison, where lack of adequate diet or exercise or other living
conditions may do harm to the fetus.
2.) Post-birth: Any woman charged for a first time under this
statute after the birth of her child immediately shall be diverted
into an appropriate residential treatment center for a minimum of
one month unless her treating physicians present evidence to the
court that early release is in the best interest of the woman, her
family, and society.
Any woman charged for a second or subsequent time under this
Pollitt, Fetal Rights. A New Assault on Feminism; Laws Protecting the Fetus from the Mother,
250 NATION 409, (1990).
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statute after the birth of her child shall be subject to the same pen-
alties as any other crime of this degree.
COMMENT: Post-birth, the primary concern for a first-time of-
fender under this statute will be that of rehabilitation. A treat-
ment center is the appropriate setting for this rehabilitation.
However, if a woman persists in repeated violations of this stat-
ute (in subsequent pregnancies), deterrence overtakes rehabilita-
tion as a prime concern, and jail or prison is the appropriate
setting post-birth.
Exclusivity:
No woman shall be given a longer sentence for a non-pregnancy-
related crime for activities covered within this legislation.
COMMENT: Preventive detention is an inappropriate "solu-
tion" to the problem of pregnant addicts. If a woman's activities
fall within the purview of this statute, those activities may not be
used to justify a clearly excessive jail or prison sentence for an
unrelated criminal charge.
Expungement:
Any woman who is charged under this statute during her preg-
nancy or for a first time after the birth of her child and who suc-
cessfully completes the treatment program to which she is diverted
may, after three years, petition the court for expungement of the
record of this crime. Unless the petitioner has been charged under
this statute in the intervening three years, the court should honor
the request in all but the most unusual of cases. Prior convictions
for other types of crimes shall have no effect on the court's decision
to expunge the record of this crime.
COMMENT: This statute is intended as protection for fetuses.
It should not be used to stigmatize forever women who once have
been charged under it. There is no state interest in maintaining a
record of a woman's first conviction under this statute if she sub-
sequently has abstained from violating it for three years.
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